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THE ALIENATION OF FATHERS
Linda Kelly*
Maternal preference has long been rejected as an unconstitutional
vehicle responsible for perpetuating outdated and inaccurate stereotypes
regarding the parenting ability of mothers and fathers.' However, little
attention is paid to how identical gender biases continue in other legal
arenas, such as imnnigration. Announcing the decision of Miller v. Al-
bright3 in 1998, the Supreme Court upheld a provision of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) that refuses citizenship as a matter ofjus sangui-
nis, or "right of blood," to a child born-abroad and out-of-wedlock to a
United States father and alien mother unless during the child's minority
paternity has been established and the father has assumed financial respon-
sibility. 4 By contrast, the statute requires no similar post-birth affirmative
action of a citizen mother in order for her child's United States citizenship
to be recognized.
In the United States, the statutory privilege ofjus sanguinis theoretically
may underpin the citizenship of children born abroad or in the United
States to United States parents. However, for a child born on United States
soil, the principle is not required. That child, born on United States soil,
whether born to alien or United States citizen parents, is constitutionally
recognized as a citizen by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of the
doctrine of jus soli-or "right of soil."' Accordingly, given the plenary
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law.
1. For a discussion of the rejection of maternal preference or the "tender years"
doctrine, see LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 728-34 (2nd ed.,
2000). The failure of this reform, though, to effect the equal treatment of parents is
routinely made in custody law. For a discussion of the perpetuation of maternal prefer-
ence through more neutral custody rules, such as the "best interests" standard, see infra
note 28 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Is There A Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology
and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000) (Focusing on how the plenary power doctrine's strength may be
undercut, Professor Chin has recently discussed the racial and gender biases in immigra-
tion law.); Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good Victims: Discarding
Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 557
(2000) (focusing on the history of gender biases in immigration law).
3. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
4. See id. For a further discussion of Miller, see infra notes 10, 47 and accompanying
text.
5. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S.
CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
For a further discussion of the application of the principles of jus sanguinis and jus
soli in the United States see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
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power wielded by the political branches over matters affecting our bor-
ders, the Miller decision's limit on an unwed father's statutory ability to
confer citizenship by blood might simply be dismissed as yet another
"immigration aberration." Since the earliest cases of Chae Chan Ping v.
United States6 and Fong Yue Ting v. United States,' the notion of sover-
eignty is recognized to give the political branches absolute control over
matters affecting the admission and deportation of aliens. Consequently,
whenever the immigration card is played, individual constitutional rights
otherwise protected are trumped." Given this marginalization of rights, it
comes as no surprise that "immigration scholars love to hate the plenary
power doctrine." 9
AND POLICY 1030-39 (2d ed. 1997). For critical perspectives on the principle ofjus soli
see PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT-ILLEGAL
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985) (questioning the constitutional protection
underpinning the principle ofjus soli); c. Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 485 (1987) (attacking position of Schuck and Smith).
6. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). Petitioner had been a lawful permanent resident for 12
years. After Ping left the United States with a certificate to re-entry, Congress amended
the Chinese Exclusion Act, thereby declaring these certificates void and of no effect. The
legislation was upheld upon the Supreme Court's rationalization that just as Congress had
the right to protect the country from invading armies it surely had an inherent right to
protect against "the vast hordes of people crowding in upon us." Id. at 606.
7. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). Through an amendment to the Chinese Exclusion Act, a
Chinese resident could be deported if he had not obtained a certificate of residence or
could not show through the testimony of "one credible white witness" that he was a
lawful resident. Id. at 727. Upholding the provision, the Court found that the right to
deport foreigners, like the right to exclude them, was "an inherent and inalienable right
of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its
welfare." Id. at 711.
8. See, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 US 471
(1999) (holding no selective prosecution defense available for undocumented aliens in
deportation proceedings); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)
(holding no Fourth Amendment warrantless "search and seizure" protection for nonresi-
dent aliens against United States government conduct outside the United States); Fiallo v.
Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (limiting equal protection scrutiny available to unwed fathers
challenging an immigration provision that affords mothers a greater opportunity to peti-
tion for alien children); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (limiting
consideration of First Amendment rights when Attorney General denied visa to Marxist
advocate seeking admission).
9. Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitu-
tional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. Rav. 1, 7 (1998). Despite the absence of an
explicit constitutional delegation of power to the federal government over immigration
matters, the power, per se, is not generally disputed. Rather, it is the breadth of the
power that is the subject of much analysis and critique. For a sampling from the wealth of
scholarship assessing the plenary power doctrine, particularly its influence upon individual
rights not traditionally associated with questions of border control, see e.g., Linda S.
Bosniak, Membership, Equality and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1047 (1994) (discussing difference in rights accorded aliens inside and outside of immi-
gration law); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
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However, despite the authority of the plenary power doctrine, Miller
advances perhaps an even more unsettling position. Announcing the
judgment of the court, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Rehnquist, re-
jected reliance upon the plenary power doctrine and determined that the
statute did not violate the heightened scrutiny given gender claims.'0
How did the INA gender disparity survive an equal protection chal-
lenge? We may comfortably believe we live in an age when sex-based
classifications are routinely prohibited. Recent decisions such as that end-
ing the gender bias of the male-only admission policy of the Virginia
Military Institute support this belief." Yet, like child custody, immigration
jurisprudence reveals an ongoing pattern of gender disparity. Fathers,
particularly unwed fathers, remain our "debtors and criminals.' ' 12 As this
Essay goes to press, a Supreme Court decision is being awaited in Nguyen
v. INS. 3 Nguyen effectively rechallenges the immigration provision at
issue in Miller and raises similar arguments against it. However, regardless
of the outcome in Nguyen, immigration law may maintain a disparate
treatment of mothers and fathers. The reduction of a father's parenting
role to a financial obligation as represented by Miller affirms the marginali-
zation of unwed fathers otherwise endorsed by the Court in the
immigration context.
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625 (1992) (examining
difference between substantive and procedural rights afforded aliens); Michael Scaper-
landa, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REv. 707
(1996) (asserting that the plenary power over immigration enjoyed by the political
branches should be limited to matters of communal formation); Margaret H. Taylor,
Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary
Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087 (1995) (discussing conflict between the
plenary power doctrine and the aliens' rights tradition). For a recent exchange on
whether the plenary power doctrine use in the immigration law context has simply
served as a proxy to limit individual rights consistent with the protection historically
afforded them outside of the sphere of immigration law, see Chin, supra note 2. Cf
Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There a
Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289 (2000).
10. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434 n.l (1998) (plurality opinion). The
majority position in Miller was comprised of three separate opinions, while there were
two dissenting opinions. For an analysis of the opinions and their significance in immi-
gration law see Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of
Plenary Power:Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1999 Sup.
CT. R-Ev. 1; Kelly, supra note 2.
11. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976) (striking down gender disparity in alcohol consumption laws).
12. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 215 (1985).
13. Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528 (5th Cit. 2000) (holding that statute does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct 29 (2000). Oral arguments
were heard on January 9, 2001. For more on Nguyen, see Supreme Court Hears Arguments
in Transmittal of Citizenship Case, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 229 (2001).
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By evaluating immigration and custody law from a father's perspec-
tive and thereby uncovering and addressing the biases held against men,
both fathers and mothers will achieve greater recognition. Beyond re-
vealing gender discrimination, such a study also demonstrates the disparate
views still harbored toward unmarried parents. Examining custody and
immigration law with an emphasis on these issues will hopefully foster a
dialogue that brings the law in line with the reality of today's families and
promotes each family member's individual potential.
I. THE HISTORY OF FATHERS AND CUSTODY
While the "natural" parental duties of each sex have evolved with
societal developments, fathers have never been recognized to have the
nurturing ability that is thought to be inherent to women. This inability
to care is a characteristic particularly attributed to unwed fathers.
Consistent with the notion of coverture, the earliest treatment of the
family in American law allowed a man's wife as well as his legitimate
children to be regarded as his property.' 4 However, the child born out-of-
wedlock was "filius nullius"-the child and heir of no one.' s While the
moral implication of this treatment of illegitimate children may have been
an effort to prevent out-of-wedlock relationships, the legal implication
was to protect a man's ability to independently control his property and
family lineage. 16 Ultimately, the shift toward awarding a mother custody
of her children that began in the early nineteenth century was also a by-
product of a desire to protect male interests. The "tender-years doctrine"
in favor of awarding mothers custody emerged as societal and industrial
developments demanded that men work outside the home.'7 The growing
recognition that children were not merely small adults whose services
could be doled out by the father but that their proper moral and religious
upbringing and education required significant attention also contributed
to the change.' In order for men to run the country, women were
charged with caring for children. Consequently, the female image at
14. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
15. HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 1, at 711-13.
16. See id. at 196. In this manner, bastardy law may be seen to complement liberal-
ism's promotion and safeguard of individualism and the public/private dichotomy.
However, for the basic criticism of liberalism as a means to mask male dominance
through neutral principles, abstract rules, and rights talk, see MARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); Joan Williams,
Gender Wars: Seffless Wornen in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. tEv. 1559 (1991).
17. MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD: CHILD CARE, WOMEN'S
RIGHTS AND THE MYTH OF THE GOOD MOTHER 51-54 (1993); Carol Sanger, Separating
from Children, 96 COLUM L. REV. 375, 399-403 (1996).
18. See BERRY, supra note 17, at 54; see also GROSSBERG, supra note 12, at 235-37,
Sanger, supra note 17, at 399-403.
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coverture as "devious, sexually voracious, emotionally inconstant, and
physically and intellectually inferior," was replaced with the image of
women as the model of virtue and care.1 9 While social demands and the
transformed image of women allowed women to be viewed as the pri-
mary caretakers and awarded women custody as the number of custody
disputes grew with the growing number of cases of separation and di-
vorce, illegitimate children were also affected. In keeping with the
changing gender roles, women could now also be recognized as the
"natural" caretakers of illegitimate children.20 Fathers, on the other hand,
would be charged with the financial expectation of keeping their illegiti-
mate children off the public dole.21
While such developments in the treatment of illegitimate children
marked the beginnings of the limited expectations of unwed fathers, the
interest in both maintaining the virtuous image of women and the desire
to protect the "nuclear family" of a husband, wife, and their legitimate
children together also impacted married fathers.22 For example, through
the doctrine barring spousal testimony, a husband was prevented from
proving that his wife's child belonged to another. As one court, quoting
Montesquieu, stated, "[T]he wickedness of mankind makes it necessary
for the laws to suppose [men] better than they really are. Thus we judge
19. BERRY, supra note 17, at 51.
20. GROSSBERG, supra note 12, at 208.
21. Id. at 207-18.
22. For more recent jurisprudential recognition of marital and familial privacy, see,
e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923). This perception of the marital unit as an inviolable entity is today a common
target of feminists. Catherine MacKinnon's work perhaps represents the leading and most
exhaustive feminist effort to -"explode" the violence of privacy and the effect of the
public/private distinction on issues ranging from abortion to sexual harassment to por-
nography. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 100 (1987).
Similarly, a great deal of work has been done by feminists seeking to end domestic vio-
lence by transforming it from being treated as a private issue to being recognized as a
public harm. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love"; Wife Beating as Prerogative, 105
YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (arguing that domestic violence once perpetuated as a right of
marital privacy persists through today's gender-neutral domestic violence statutes); Eliza-
beth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE:
THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 36, 49-53 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne
Mykitiuk eds., 1994); Elizabeth Schneider, Tie Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973
(1991); Malinda L. Seymore, Isn't it a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and
Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U. L. Rv. 1032, 1070-73 (analyzing the interplay of spousal
immunity and domestic violence).
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that every child conceived in wedlock is legitimate, the law having a
confidence in the mother as if she were chastity itself."
2 3
II. THE PARALLELS OF CUSTODY AND CITIZENSHIP
The right to confer citizenship upon one's children through jus san-
guinis tracks the gender distinctions of custody law. With the initial
treatment of children as a father's property, it is not surprising that the first
blood right citizenship laws of 1790 required an alien child to depend
upon his father's citizenship in order to become a citizen.14 While the
gender disparity within bloodright citizenship laws was clearly evident,
the issue proved a divisive one for early feminists, as it raised the funda-
mental question of whether the feminist agenda should focus solely on
political rights or concentrate on ameliorating both political and non-
political inequalities. Yet despite the movement's own division on the
issue, sufficient attention was brought to the matter. In 1934, legislation
was passed that would allow the United States citizenship of either the
mother or father to entitle the child to become a United States citizen,
26regardless of marital status. While the notion of women as the natural
caretakers was instrumental in promoting this achievement for citizen
mothers, the negative image of the unwed father remained strong. Six
years later, in 1940, legislation was passed that first introduced the ques-
tion of legitimacy into citizenship law. The legislation challenged an
unwed father to redeem his negative, scoundrel image by entitling his
child to citizenship only if the father's paternity was legally established
23. Egbert v. Greenwalt, 44 Mich. 245, 249 (1880) (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS); see also GROSSBERG, supra note 12, at 19.
24.
The children of citizens of the States, that may be born beyond sea, or
out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born
citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descent to per-
sons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States.
Act of Mar, 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 104.
25. The issue of bloodright citizenship for foreign-born children proved divisive
within the feminist movement as it raised the fundamental question of whether the
feminist agenda should focus solely on political rights or have an encompassing political,
social, and civil rights vision. For an historical account of the controversy over bloodright
citizenship within the feminist movement, see CANDACE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATION-
ALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 151-71 (1998).
26. Act of May 24, 1934, 48 Stat. 797. At about the same time, the Senate ratified an
equal-nationality treaty produced at the Pan-American Conference at Montevideo in
December, 1933. Consistent with the 1934 legislation addressingjus sanguinis citizenship,
the treaty promoted gender equality in all civil and political matters. For further discus-
sion of such events, see BREDBENNER, supra note 25, at 238-41.
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during the child's minority.- Of course, the mother as "natural caretaker"
required no legislative encouragement. Consistent with the custody doc-
trine of "tender years," she was naturally presumed to care for her child.-
Such historic minimal expectations of fathers in both custody and
immigration law are consistent with more recent societal developments.
In custody, while the "best interests" standard is one of gender neutrality,
as a practical matter, mothers are still disproportionately awarded cus-
tody.2 9 Accordingly, as a result of mothers generally receiving custody,
visitation rights are typically awarded to fathers. However, there is no
widely used legal mechanism or social pressure for requiring a father to
visit with his child.30 This lack of visitation enforcement is consistent with
the historic treatment of fathers as simply providers of financial support.
Indeed, in contrast to the legal indifference to a non-custodial parent's
unwillingness to visit with his child, the non-custodial parent's financial
obligation is a duty that is strictly enforced.3 Legal child support enforce-
ment units as well as the societal attitude toward "deadbeat dads" reaffirm
that a father's sole duty is to financially provide for his child.
Other custodial issues brought before the Supreme Court reaffirm
that unwed fathers will only be recognized if "something more" than a
blood connection has already been demonstrated . For example, in Stan-
ley v. illinois,33 while an Illinois statute prohibiting an unwed father from
gaining custody of his children upon the mother's death was struck down
as a violation of equal protection, it was done so only after the father was
found to have had a pre-existing relationship with his children.34 The
court could therefore conclude that he had a "substantial interest" in
retaining custody.3 s As the Stanley decision suggests, unwed fathers are
unsuccessful in bringing equal protection challenges if no relation to their
27. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-876, § 205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1139.
28. Such legislation did, however, impose some limitations on unwed mothers. A
child of an unwed citizen mother would be entitled to United States citizenship only
provided paternity was not established during his minority. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub.
L. No. 76-876, 5§ 201, 205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138-40.
29. For a discussion of this practical result and its implications, see Nancy E. Dowd,
Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 FLA. L. REV. 523 (1996); Linda Kelly, The Fantastic Adventure of
Supermomn and the Alien: Educating inmigration Policy on the Facts of Life, 31 CONN. L. REV.
1045, 1049-56 (1999).
30. Of course, the legal system's failure to respond when a non-custodial parent does
not take advantage of his visitation opportunity must be distinguished from the legal
system's clear efforts to guarantee that a non-custodial parent's desire to visit with his
child not be thwarted by the custodial parent or other forces.
31. For a discussion of the legal tools of enforcement see HARRIS & TEITELBAUM,
supra note 1, at 664-89.
32. Dowd, supra note 29, at 526.
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children other than biological can be proven. As a result, in Lehr v. Rob-
ertson , the Supreme Court was able to reject an unwed father's claim for
an absolute right of notice prior to his child's adoption, finding that the
father's lack of relationship with his children prevented this right.37 The
result of Michael H3 8 is no different. While denying an unwed father (with
a 98% scientific certainty of being the father) standing to establish himself
as the father of a child born to a married woman, the Supreme Court
presumed that the unwed biological father could not have a valuable
relationship with his child.39 The minimal financial obligation normally
required would in this instance presumptively be assumed by the married
woman's husband. In making this decision, the Court not only reaffirmed
its minimal expectation of unwed fathers but also observed "the historic
respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term" for having a
child raised within a traditional nuclear family of two parents and depend-
40ent children.
These minimal expectations of fathers, particularly the image of un-
wed fathers and the "deadbeat dad image" that remain in custody law,
help explain why, in 1986, further challenges were added to the blood-
right citizenship laws for unwed fathers. In addition to requiring a legal
showing of paternity, the law was amended to demand that an unwed
father assume a financial obligation for his out-of-wedlock, foreign-born
child.4 ' Again, no similar financial obligation is placed upon an unwed
mother in order for her foreign-born child to become a citizen.
Consistent with the negative image of fathers evident in our citi-
zenship laws, laws allowing a father to petition for his child to become a
lawful permanent resident-that is, a "green card holder"-also reflect a
certain contempt. Deciding the Fiallo v. Bell 42 case in 1977, the Supreme
Court upheld a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that
completely prohibited an unwed father from petitioning for the residency
of his child.4 3 In upholding this provision, the Court conceded that Con-
gress' bias against unwed fathers was motivated, at least in part, by "a
36. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
37. See id.
38. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
39. See id.
40. Id. at 123.
41. Act of Nov. 14, 1986, sec. 13, § 309(a) (3)-(4), 100 Stat. 3655 (1986) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. 5 1409(a) (3)-(4)). Another limitation added was the reduction
of the child's age (from 21 to 18) by which time paternity must be established. However,
in addition to the 1940 legislation's basis for proving paternity by legitimation or court
adjudication, it may now also be established by a father's writing under oath. See id. The
1986 amendments also now place a one year United States residency requirement on a
mother prior to the child's birth. See id.
42. 430 U.S. 787 (1987).
43. See id. (upholding INA %9 101(b) (1) (D), 101(b) (2) (1952)).
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perceived absence of close family ties" between a father and his child.
44
Reacting to Fiallo, Congress indicated that it wanted unwed fathers to
have relationships with their children-it just did not expect them to do
so without some legal prodding.4 s The amended statute now requires that
for an unwed father to petition for the residency of his alien child, he
must affirmatively show that he "has or had a bona fide parent-child rela-
tionship., 46 Again, no demands are placed upon mothers other than
showing their natural, biological connection. As the Court had stated in
Miller, a statute requiring a mother to demonstrate her relationship with
her child would be "superfluous. 4 1 Unlike fathers, the caring ability of
mothers is presumed.
Looking beyond custody law and uncovering the disparate treatment
of fathers and mothers in immigration and nationality laws remind us that
defining parenthood, an issue central to achieving gender equality, re-
mains unresolved.48 However, this observation is not made to suggest that
fathers and mothers now parent in an equal fashion. 49 Nor is it made to
suggest that financial support obligations should be reduced, or to suggest
that the financial obligations should not be enforced, perhaps even more
strictly than they already are. ° Rather, my argument is that more than
financial support should be expected from men in their roles as fathers.
And, as a corollary, attitudes regarding women and their role as mothers
should change. Legitimate debates may continue as to whether mothers
and fathers should follow a gender-neutral model of parenting or whether
gender may dictate specific roles.5' However, regardless of one's position
44. Id. at 787.
45. IRCA § 315(a) (1986).
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (D) (1999).
47. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 439 (1988).
48. While it is beyond the scope of this paper, it must at a minimum be recognized
that disagreement continues on the question of what constitutes "true" gender equality.
For example, like the feminists of the 1930s, feminists today continue to debate the
definition of equality, the differences between men and women, and the role of the
government in resolving this timeless question. For an analysis of this fundamental di-
lemma within feminism, see, e.g., Williams, supra note 16.
49. A recent study, released in 1998 by the Families and Work Institute, reports that
while working men are spending more time with their children than in the past, working
women continue to spend more time with their children. Tamar Lewin, Men Assuming
Bigger Share at Home, New Survey Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1998, at A18; see also
Naomi R. Cahn, Gendered Identities: Women and Household Work, 44 VILL. L. REV. 525,
530 (1999); Dowd, supra note 29, at 523-24.
50. For a discussion of the host of issues raised by child support, ranging from the
fundamental problems encountered in child support determinations, modification, and
enforcement to challenges created by second families, bankruptcy, and taxes see HARRIS
& TEITELBAUM, supra note 1, at 561-710.
51. For a comparison of the gender-neutral and gender-specific models of parenting
and the problems raised by each see Dowd, supra note 29, at 530-33. For advocacy of
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as to such, both fathers and mothers should be viewed as equal parents,
both possessing emotional and economic obligations.
III. DEFINING FATHERS As PARENTS
In the custody setting, the minimal expectation and negative image
of fathers is finally beginning to receive attention. Changing attitudes
toward male parenting is evident in the growing use of joint custody
awards and the strengthening of the fathers' rights movement.12 At the
American Association of Law Schools 2000 Annual Meeting, a panel of
advocates for fathers at the national and grassroots level as well as acade-
micians was dedicated to the topic of "rethinking fatherhood. '5 3 While
the group was not without controversy and members advocated varying
approaches, the panel was united in recognizing that the message "fathers
matter" needed to be heard and supported.
4
Leading the charge on the academic front, Professor Nancy Dowd
argues that "rethinking fatherhood" beyond limited biological and finan-
cial ties requires recognizing the positive impact of casting fathers as
nurturers.5 Such recognition would emphasize that fathers can and already
do parent. Observing that "[g]ood parenting is not sex-specific nor sex-
related," Professor Dowd's attention to fathers also reminds us that moth-
ers are perhaps recognized as better parents, not because of biology, but
adopting motherhood as the parenting model for both mothers and fathers see MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 233-36 (1995).
52. See Dowd, supra note 29, at 523. For a further discussion of the growing use of
joint custody see HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 1, at 783-804.
53. Rethinking Fatherhood: Legal, Social and Economic Perspectives, Program
delivered at the AALS Annual Meeting, Washington D.C. (January 6, 2000) (transcript
on file with author and available from AALS) (program to be published by the Maryland
Law Review).
54. Six panelists presented varying perspectives on fatherhood. For example, in his
presentation, Wade F. Horn, President and Co-Founder of the National Fatherhood
Initiative, advocated marriage as the best solution to promoting fatherhood. As a result of
field research on the behavior of new fathers to children born out-of-wedlock, Sara S.
McLanahan, a professor of sociology, argued that fathers' increased involvement with
children was dependent upon early involvement with their children. Joe Jones, Director
of Strive Baltimore, supported reaching fathers in poorer neighborhoods through more
grassroot tactics of physically going door-to-door and providing education and job skills.
Law professors Joan Williams and Michael L. Selmi focused on making workplace condi-
tions supportive of parenting. Finally, Nancy Dowd concentrated on both economic and
social forces that affect how fatherhood is defined. For the opinions presented see Re-
thinking Fatherhood, supra note 53.
55. Dowd, supra note 29; see also NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD
(2000).
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because of culture. 6 Professor Dowd acknowledges the difficulties in
reconstructing fatherhood in the nurturing image. The reality of male
violence toward women and children is a legitimate reason for being
apprehensive about entitling males to another source of power by rou-
tinely awarding men custody. 7 Additionally, homophobia and male
machismo prevent men from easily assuming the nurturing role that has
been culturally identified as feminine. 8
Compounding such difficulties is the resistance women demonstrate
to the notion of altering their roles as mothers. Because the female iden-
tity has become so inextricably linked with motherhood and nurturing,
allowing men to assume a greater parenting role is perceived to threaten
the core female identity.' 9 Men, it is feared, cannot be better parents un-
less women relinquish some of their duties.60 Such fears are both
exaggerated and flawed. Parenting is not a "zero-sum" game. Assigning
fathers a substantial parenting role should not threaten women. At the
most basic day-to-day level, only one parent may be required to pick up a
child from school, to make supper, or to read a bedtime story. However,
we surely think that true parenting, by a mother or father, is comprised of
more than a collection, albeit exhausting, of daily activities. Moreover,
equalizing the daily, physical duties of fathers and mothers provides criti-
cal opportunities for women. Statistics reveal that women today remain
primarily responsible for such physically laborious child care duties.6 Yet
freeing mothers from some of these duties by sharing them proportion-
ately with fathers does not marginalize the female persona but instead
provides the opportunity for true expression. Women will be able to use
the energy and time otherwise allotted to child care to compete more
56. Dowd, supra note 29, at 531. Indeed, my historical outline of how mothers came
to be associated with "nurture" and fathers with the image of "debtors and criminals"
affirms this impression. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
57. See Dowd, supra note 29, at 533.
58. Id. at 533.
59. For a sampling from the legal literature that reviews the problems raised by the
notion that a woman's paramount achievement and responsibility is to bear and raise
children, see e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 51 (discussing the significance of motherhood for
women and application of the notion to men); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Mother-
hood: Conflicting Definitions firom Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL
L. R.Ev. 688 (1998) (looking at treatment of mother in welfare, family, and criminal law
settings); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 134-69 (1989)
(acknowledging how women are conditioned to make child-rearing their primary func-
tion before, during, and after marriage); Sanger, supra note 17 (discussing how various
forces, including legal and cultural, have combined to promote motherhood).
60. Cahn, supra note 49, at 530.
61. Lewin, supra note 49; see also Cahn, supra note 49, at 530; Dowd, supra note 29,
at 523-24.
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effectively with men in the marketplace. 6' Accordingly, as female and
male employees increasingly share such family responsibilities, the market
will be forced to alter its traditional demand for "ideal workers," uncon-
strained by child care responsibilities.63 Responding to the real needs of
employees may include such improvements as on-site child care and more
significant parental leave policies. Ultimately, such changes would receive
64state and federal support.
Of course, none of these aspirations for working mothers can be re-
alized without emphasizing that not all mothers want to compete
aggressively in the market. Despite a possible future of improved working
conditions for parents, many mothers may still choose to prioritize child
care responsibilities to employment. Such women should not be accused
of false consciousness. Provided an atmosphere exists in which both
women and men can individually resolve the challenge of work and fam-
ily without being restricted (in either setting) by their gender, all
choices-from childless working women, to working mothers and fathers,
to stay-at-home dads--should be celebrated. Ultimately, it is only by
addressing both the male and female halves of the gender equation that
true gender neutrality can be actualized.
IV. REDEFINING THE FAMILY IDEAL
Returning our attention to championing the cause of fathers, specifi-
cally never-wed fathers, the elimination of another bias that exists both in
custody and immigration law could be achieved. Despite the present and
growing existence of children born out-of-wedlock and "alternative"
family structures, the "nuclear family" of two spouses and dependent• 65
children remains the ideal. The increasing rates of divorce, number of
62. On the "vicious cycle" created when overwhelming domestic duties prevent
women from being able to compete effectively in the workplace and as a result lead to
inferiority in the labor market and at home see OKIN, supra note 59, at 134-69.
63. For a discussion of the "ideal worker" phenomenon and its impact on women
see Kelly, supra note 29, at 1051-56; M.M. Slaughter, The Legal Construction of "Mother,"
in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD
73, 78-82 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995); Williams, supra note
16, at 1596-97.
64. For a discussion of current public child care options see Maria L. Ontiveros, The
Myths of Market Forces, Mothers and Private Employment: The Parental Leave Veto, 1 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'y 25 (1992) (discussing the Family Medical Leave Act); Sanger, supra
note 17, at 474; Eugenia Hargrave, Income Tax Treatment of Child and Dependent Care
Costs: The 1981 Amendments, 60 TEX. L. REV. 321 (1982) (discussing tax credits and
federal subsidies for children).
65. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive States: The Need for
Legal Alternatives Mhen the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879,
880-81 (1984); Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of Family in
American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 388.
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children born out-of-wedlock, popularity of adoption, and acceptance of
surrogacy contracts and other technologically supported methods of child-
birth all evidence that reality does not conform to the nuclear family
ideal.66 Nevertheless, "alternative" family structures, including single par-
ents, are stigmatized and punished, while those who can best emulate the
nuclear family ideal are rewarded. The decision of Michael H to ignore
an unwed father's claim to paternity of his child against a nuclear family
comprised of the child's natural mother and her husband well illustrates
611
this point.
Certainly, in advocating for fathers and alternative families in the
immigration context, the plenary power doctrine further complicates
matters. As Fiallo evidenced in rejecting an unwed father's claim to peti-
tion for the residency of his alien child, the plenary power doctrine may
be raised to prevent any judicial pressure to change the existing nuclear
family ideal and gender-biased approach. 69 Against the combination of
these challenges, the ability to "rethink fatherhood" in the immigration
context seems more daunting a task than that faced by advocates in the
custody reform debate.
Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court cautioned in Moore v. City of
East Cleveland,70 when it recognized the fundamental right to family unity
for extended family members nearly 25 years ago, the history and tradi-
tion of the United States compel a larger conception of family entitled to
legal protection.7 ' The need to define family beyond a nuclear definition
and to recognize the rights of unwed fathers and mothers is even more
critical in immigration law as the law directly impacts individuals from
66. For varying evaluations on the current and historical rates of divorce, the effect of
the nationwide adoption of no-fault divorce, and the impact of divorce on children see
HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 1, at 359-78. On the treatment of single parents see
NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES (1997). On the use of adop-
tion and technological means of child conception see John Lawrence Hill, What Does It
Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 353 (1991).
67. Fineman, supra note 65 (discussing social influences allowing nuclear family to be
considered "sacred" and "ideal"); GROSSBERG, supra note 12, at 235-85 (discussing his-
toric promotion of the nuclear family); Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52
AL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (discussing the preference given the nuclear family
model in custody cases involving divorcing and never-wed parents, as well as in the
adoption and surrogacy settings).
68. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). For a further discussion of Mi-
chael H, see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
69. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). For a further discussion of Fiallo, see supra
notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
70. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
71. See id. (invalidating a zoning ordinance that defined family by limiting the rela-
tions entitled to live together). For further discussion of Moore see Frederick E. Dashiell,
The Right to Family Life: Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 6 BLACK L.J. 288 (1980).
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other cultures. Imposing a "culturally myopi[c]" definition of family upon
immigrants from throughout the world flaunts both the reality that exists
in the United States and in other countries throughout the world.72 Con-
sequently, recognizing the gender biases that exist in immigration law is
another step toward achieving true gender equality and family integrity.
72. Moore, 431 U.S. at 507-08 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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